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Abstract
We show that the waterbed effect, i.e. the pass-through of a change
in one price of a firm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter
include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in
mobile network competition with a fixed number of customers, the
waterbed effect is full under two-part tariffs, while it is only partial
under linear tariffs.
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1 Introduction
The "waterbed effect" describes the interdependence between prices at multiple-
good firms and multi-sided platforms. As much as a waterbed rises on one
side if it is pressed down on the other, firms may optimally change prices if
some other price is forced to a different level, for example through regulatory
interventions. The extent of the waterbed effect can be a contentious issue
when it would weaken the effectiveness of the regulatory measures. In the
debate about the downward regulation of the charges paid by fixed networks
to mobile networks for routing calls from the former to their receivers on
the latter, the so-called "mobile termination rates", mobile networks have
claimed that the result would be higher retail prices for mobile customers,
while regulators argued there would be no effect.1
∗Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de
Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal; email: shoernig@novasbe.pt.
1See Schiff (2008) for an introduction to the waterbed effect and a discussion of these
issues.
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In this note we show how the waterbed effect depends on the type of
tariff that is charged to the unregulated side of the market. On the regulated
side, the firm receives a fixed payment per customer of the unregulated side.
This payment can be the profits from fixed-to-mobile termination of calls,
or advertising, or any other profits that depend on the customer’s existence
(rather than his usage). We determine the pass-through for two-part tariffs,
where customers pay for subscription and usage, and for linear tariffs where
they only pay for usage.2 We show that the waterbed effect is much stronger
under two-part than under linear tariffs; in particular, under the assump-
tion of a fixed number of mobile subscribers we show that under two-part
tariffs the waterbed effect is full, while it is only partial with linear tariffs.
This implies that downward regulation of some price leads to a stronger rise
negative effect on clients of the other services if the latter are charged a multi-
part tariff. In particular, this result contracts mobile networks’contention
that lower fixed-to-mobile termination rates would disproportionately hurt
customers on pre-pay tariffs.
The issue of the strength of the waterbed effect has been studied in both
in theoretical and empirical work. Wright (2002) remains the most important
theoretical treatment of fixed-to-mobile interconnection. He shows, generi-
cally, that if the pass-through of fixed costs to profits is full (partial), net-
works are indifferent about termination rates (jointly want to set them at the
monopoly level). Below we show that these cases arise due to competition in
two-part or linear tariffs, respectively.3
Genakos and Valletti (2011a, 2011b) provide an empirical study of the
waterbed effect with simultaneous fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile in-
terconnection. They show that the waterbed effect is significantly stronger
for post-pay (two-part) than for pre-pay (linear) tariffs. They ascribe this
difference to how the regulation of mobile termination rates affects the inter-
connection of calls between mobile networks, and therefore indirectly changes
how intensively networks compete for subscribers. While their argument is
certainly correct, it is does not take into account that the actual direct pass-
through of fixed-to-mobile termination profits depends on the type of tariffs
in the mobile market. In this note, we isolate this factor by considering the
two types of termination separately.
2In the market, these types of contract are normally denoted as "post-pay" or "pre-pay
/ pay-as-you-go" tariffs.
3Armstrong (2002) discusses a model of perfect competition in two-part tariffs. It
exhibits a full waterbed effect due to the type of tariff, not due to the type of competition.
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2 Model Setup
The model setup is a generalization of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) to
many networks and general (instead of Hotelling) subscription demand. We
assume that there are n ≥ 2 symmetric mobile networks i = 1, ..., n who
compete in tariffs. In the main text we consider linear and two-part tariffs
that do not discriminate between calls within the same network (on-net calls)
and those to rival networks (off-net calls), while in the appendix we analyze
tariffs which price discriminate between these types of calls. Thus for now
we assume that network i charges a price pi for each call minute. In case
networks compete in two-part tariffs it also charges a fixed fee Fi.
The marginal on-net cost of a call is c > 0 and the cost of terminating a
call is c0 > 0. Networks charge each other the access charge a per incoming
call minute. Thus the marginal cost of an off-net call is c+m, wherem = a−c0
is the termination margin. There is a monthly fixed cost f per customer,
and networks receive further monthly profits of Q per customer that do not
originate from payments for retail services offered to them. Our focus will
be on how equilibrium profits depend on Q.
From making a call of length q, a consumer obtains utility u(q), where
u(0) = 0, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. For call price p, the indirect utility is
v(p) = maxq u(q) − pq, call demand is q (p) = −v′(p) with elasticity η(p) =
−pq′(p)/q(p). Receiving a call of length q yields utility βu(q), where β ≥ 0
indicates the strength of the call externality. Letting vi = v(pi) and assuming
a balanced calling pattern (i.e. subscribers call any other subscriber with the
same probability) the surplus of a consumer on network i is given by
wi = vi + β
n∑
j=1
αjuj − Fi,
where Fi is zero for a linear tariff. The market share of network i = 1, ..., n
is assumed to be
αi = A (wi − w1, ..., wi − wn) ,
where An : Rn → R is strictly increasing and symmetric in its arguments,
with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1,
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, from which follows that A(0, ..., 0) = 1/n. Let
σ = dA (x, 0, ..., 0) /dx|x=0.4
Denote the profits from a pair of originated and terminated calls between
networks i and j as Pij = (pi−c−m)qi+mqj, i, j = 1, ..., n (access payments
4This demand specification is encapsulates both the generalized Hotelling model of
Hoernig (2014) and the logit model αi = exp(wi)/
∑n
j=1 exp(wj). We can allow for the
more general specification αi = Di(w), but in this case σ is no longer constant. Expression
(3) remains the same, but is harder to sign.
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cancel for on-net calls). Network i’s profits are
πi = αi
(
n∑
j=1
αjPij + Fi − f +Q
)
.
3 Equilibrium Profits and the Waterbed Ef-
fect
We will now derive equilibrium profits and determine their dependence on
profits Q, for both linear and two-part tariffs. As for the latter, network i’s
first-order condition for a profit maximum is
0 =
∂πi
∂Fi
=
πi
αi
∂αi
∂Fi
+ αi
(
n∑
j=1
∂αj
∂Fi
Pij + 1
)
.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium we have αi = 1/n, ∂αi/∂Fi = − (n− 1)σ,
and for all j 6= i, ∂αj/∂Fi = σ and Pij = Pii. Solving the first-order condition
for πi we obtain
πi =
1
(n− 1)n2σ . (1)
These profits do not depend on Q, i.e. we have a full waterbed effect. As for
linear tariffs, consider the first-order condition for maximizing profits with
respect to the call price pi:
0 =
∂πi
∂pi
=
πi
αi
∂αi
∂pi
+ αi
(
n∑
j=1
∂αj
∂pi
Pij +
n∑
j=1
αj
∂Pij
∂pi
)
.
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we have pi = p∗ and qi = q∗ for all i =
1, ..., n, and thus ∂αi/∂pi = − (n− 1)σq∗ and ∂αj/∂pi = σq∗, with
πi =
1− η∗L∗
(n− 1)n2σ , (2)
where L∗ = (p∗ − c− (n− 1)m/n) /p∗ is the Lerner index for the equilibrium
call price and η∗ the corresponding price elasticity of demand. Combining
both expressions for profits shows that even in our more general framework
under two-part tariffs the call price continues equal to average cost, i.e. L∗ =
0 or p∗ = c + (n− 1)m/n, i.e. does not depend on Q at all. On the other
hand, we now need to determine ∂p∗/∂Q for linear tariffs, for which we
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combine (2) with the symmetric equilibrium profits πi = (P ∗ − f +Q) /n,
P ∗ = (p∗ − c) q∗, to obtain
dp∗
dQ
= − (n− 1)n
(n− 1)n (P ∗)′ + (η∗L∗/σ)′
,
where apostrophes denote derivatives with respect to p∗. Since p∗ is below
the monopoly price (P ∗)′ is strictly positive, and the denominator is pos-
itive unless the demand elasticity decreases very strongly as the call price
increases. The following assumption, common in the economic literature,
provides a simple suffi cient condition for (η∗L∗)′ > 0.
Assumption 1: The price elasticity of demand η(.) is non-decreasing.
Under this assumption, we conclude that under linear tariffs higher Q
feeds through to lower call prices, dp∗/dQ < 0. Finally, we obtain
d(nπi)
dQ
=
(η∗L∗/σ)′
(n− 1)n (P ∗)′ + (η∗L∗/σ)′
, (3)
which implies that only by chance the waterbed effect is full (d(nπi)/dQ =
0). Under Assumption 1, we obtain 0 < d (nπi) /dQ < 1, i.e. higher Q is
translated into higher industry profits, but only partially so.5
Summing up:
Proposition 1 In symmetric equilibrium, the waterbed effect is
1. full under two-part tariffs;
2. partial under linear tariffs.
As shown in the Appendix, much the same results hold if networks price
discriminate between on- and off-net calls, as originally discussed in Hoernig
(2010).
Two conclusions follow from these results: First, in general terms the
exact structure of tariffs on one side of a market dictates how price changes on
some other side are transmitted, even though different groups of customers
are involved. Thus the design of regulation must take types of tariffs in
unregulated market segments into account. Second, for the specific case
of regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges, our results show that
concerns about reduced consumer welfare due to the waterbed effect are less
justified for consumers on pre-pay (linear) tariffs than those on post-pay
(two-part) tariffs, contrary to what networks have often publicly claimed.
5If Assumption 1 were to be strongly violated then industry profit would even decrease
in Q. Firms’lobbying for higher Q shows that this case is merely a theoretical curiosity.
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4 Appendix: Destination-Based Price Discrim-
ination
As in Hoernig (2010), we assume that network i charges a per-minute price
pi for calls within the same network (on-net calls) and a per-minute price
p̂i for calls to the other mobile network (off-net calls). Thus either networks
charge multi-part tariffs (Fi, pi, p̂i) or linear tariffs (pi, p̂i). Letting vi = v(pi),
v̂i = v(p̂i), etc., and assuming a balanced calling pattern (i.e. subscribers call
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any other subscriber with the same probability) the surplus of a consumer
on network i is given by
wi = αi (vi + βui) +
∑
j 6=i
αj (v̂i + βûj)− Fi =
n∑
j=1
αjhij − Fi,
where hii = vi + βui and hij = v̂i + βûj for j 6= i, and Fi is equal to zero
under a linear tariff.
Denote the profits from one on-net call as Pii = (pii − c)qii and those of
a pair of outgoing and incoming off-net calls as Pij = (p̂i − c −m)q̂i +mq̂j,
j 6= i. Network i’s profits are
πi = αi
(
n∑
j=1
αjPij + Fi − f +Q
)
.
Letting h be the n × n-matrix of hij, and w and F the n × 1-vectors of wi
and Fi, we can write w = hα − F . Write market shares as αi = Di(w) and
α = D(hα − F ) for a function D : Rn → Rn with Jacobian W , then we
obtain the market share derivatives
dα
dF
= W
(
h
dα
dF
− I
)
⇐⇒ dα
dF
= −G
dα
dp
= W
(
h
dα
dp
+
dh
dp
α
)
⇐⇒ dα
dp
= G
dh
dp
α,
where I is the identity matrix and G = (I −Wh)−1W , with elements Gij,
i, j = 1, ..., n. For the derivatives with respect to fixed fees, we obtain
dαj
dFi
= −Gji.
As for call prices, note first that dh/dpi is an n×n-matrix with entry dhii/pi =
−qi+βu′(pi)q′i = −qi (1 + βηi) at position (i, i) and zeros otherwise; similarly,
for j 6= i the matrix dh/dp̂i has entries dhij/dp̂i = −q̂i and dhji/dp̂i = −q̂iβη̂i,
and is otherwise equal to zero. As a result, we have, for j = 1, ..., n,
dαj
dpi
= −qi (1 + βηi)αiGji,
dαj
dp̂i
= −q̂i
(
Gji (1− αi) + βη̂iαi
∑
k 6=i
Gjk
)
.
Since market shares sum to 1, we have Wii +
∑
j 6=iWij = 0 for all i. This
implies
∑
k 6=iGjk = −Gji,6 and thus
dαj
dp̂i
= q̂iGji ((1 + βη̂i)αi − 1) .
6If E is the n× 1-vector of ones, then W ′E = 0 implies G′E = 0.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, Wij = −σ for all i and j 6= i, and thus Wii =
(n− 1)σ. Furthermore, in symmetric equilibrium all hii ≡ hon are identical,
and so are all hij ≡ hof , for j 6= i. After some computations, we find
Gii = Gon ≡
(n− 1)σ
1− σn (hon − hof )
, Gij = Gof ≡ −
σ
1− σn (hon − hof )
, ∀j 6= i,
First we determine the equilibrium profits under multi-part tariffs, follow-
ing Hoernig (2014): The first-order condition for profit-maximization with
respect to fixed fees is
0 =
∂πi
∂Fi
=
dαi
dFi
πi
αi
+ αi
(
n∑
j=1
dαj
dFi
Pij + 1
)
,
which can be solved for the symmetric equilibrium profits (αi = 1/n, Pii =
Pmpon , Pij = P
mp
of ),
πmpi = −α2i
(
n∑
j=1
Gji
Gii
Pij −
1
Gii
)
=
1
n2
(
1
(n− 1)σ +
n (hof − hon)
n− 1 + P
mp
of − Pmpon
)
.
As is known (e.g. Hoernig 2014),7 under multi-part tariffs with price dis-
crimination between on- and off-net calls the equilibrium call prices are
pmp = c/(1 + β) and p̂mp = (c+m) / (1− β/ (n− 1)). Call prices and hon,
hof , P
mp
of and P
mp
on do not depend on Q. As a result, equilibrium profits under
multi-part tariffs are independent of Q, and the waterbed effect is full.
As for linear tariffs, the first-order condition for the profit-maximizing
on-net price at the symmetric equilibrium is
0 =
∂πi
∂pi
=
dαi
dpi
πi
αi
+ αi
(
n∑
j=1
dαj
dpi
Pij + αi
dPii
dpi
)
,
with profits under linear tariffs of
πlton = −α2i
(
n∑
j=1
Gji
Gii
Pij −
1
(1 + βηi)Gii
(
1− pi − c
pi
ηi
))
=
1
n2
(
Pof − Pon +
1− σn (hon − hof )
(n− 1)σ
1− ηLon
1 + βη
)
7This result can be derived from using the above first-order condition with respect to
the fixed fee together with those for call prices discussed below.
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and on-net Lerner index Lon = (p− c) /p. Equally, by using the first-order
condition for the profit-maximizing off-net price we obtain
0 =
∂πi
∂p̂i
=
dαi
dp̂i
πi
αi
+ αi
(
n∑
j=1
dαj
dp̂i
Pij +
∑
j 6=i
αj
dPij
dp̂i
)
,
or, with Lof = (p̂− c−m) /p̂,
πltof = −α2i
(
n∑
j=1
Gji
Gii
Pij +
∑
j 6=i
αj
((1 + βη̂i)αi − 1)Gii
(
1− p̂i − c−m
p̂i
η̂i
))
=
1
n2
(
Pof − Pon +
1− σn (hon − hof )
σ
1− η̂Lof
n− 1− βη̂
)
.
Equating πlton to π
lt
of , we obtain
1− ηLon
1 + βη
=
(n− 1) (1− η̂Lof )
n− 1− βη̂ .
This result implies that the Lerner indices tend Lon and Lof tend to move in
lockstep, that is, if higherQ leads to a lower on-net price then the off-net price
will decrease as well. While the exact comparative statics are too involved
to be discussed here, this implies that changes in Q are not compensated by
opposing shifts in on- and off-net call prices.
If call externalities and access margins are small (β,m ≈ 0), then the
equilibrium condition implies p̂ ≈ p, and similar computations as in the
main text lead to
d
(
nπlt
)
dQ
≈ (ηLon/σ)
′
(n− 1)nP ′on + (ηLon/σ)
′ ,
i.e. the above result for the waterbed effect under linear tariffs continues to
hold approximately even under discrimination between on- and off-net prices.
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